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## MORAL PASSION AND LEGAL POSITIVISM: REPLY TO ANTON DIDIKIN

The article examines the issue of a necessary connection between the phenomena of law and morality. A new classification of contemporary legal philosophy theories based on a distinction between «dietary» and «calorie» views on the question of the extent that the substantive content of law needs to be consistent with the moral requirements for it to be legal is proposed and justified. It offers a critical analysis of «dietary» views based on the assertion that the law can have any content, including absolutely immoral content (the so-called «separability thesis»).

**Keywords:** legal positivism, natural law, law, morality, separation thesis, separability thesis, dietary and calorie theories.

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