

## PERSONAL REBOOT AND SURVIVAL

The article contains a reconstruction of the rapid psychological change argument by Scott Campbell. According to the standard psychological approach, the identity of a person is tied to persistence one's memories, beliefs, wants and intentions. A person stays the same person if one holds strongly psychologically connected and continuous over time. The structure of rapid psychological change argument is compared with the argument of incredibly long-lasting psychological change by David Lewis. It is concluded that the main goals of critical attacks of these arguments are the temporal mismatch of psychological connectedness and continuity as well as the reductionist claim that all the facts what matters for survival can be described in an impersonal way.

**Keywords:** diachronic personal identity, psychological criterion, psychological continuity and connectedness, brain-zap, survival.

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**NEKHAEV Andrei Viktorovich**, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor of History, Philosophy and Social Communications Department, Omsk State Technical University, Omsk; Professor of Philosophy Department, Tyumen State University, Tyumen; Research Associate of the Laboratory of Logical and Philosophical Studies, Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Tomsk.  
 SPIN-code: 5844-9381  
 AuthorID (RSCI): 394939  
 ORCID: 0000-0003-1358-743X  
 AuthorID (SCOPUS): 57211853279  
 ResearcherID: M-7208-2016  
 Address for correspondence: A\_V\_Nehaev@rambler.ru

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